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Resumo: Investigo, neste artigo, os fundamentos do argumento maduro spinozista do monismo 
substantial. O argumento é sucintamente afirmado na Ética, Parte I, proposição 14. Ele faz apelo 
a duas premissas explícitas: (1) a de que deve haver uma substância com todos os atributos; (2) 
a de que as substâncias não podem compartilhar seus atributos. Em conjunto com uma terceira 
premissa implícita, a de que uma substância não pode não ter qualquer atributo, Spinoza infere 
que não pode haver mais que uma substância. Começo a investigação com a análise da primeira 
premissa, que é fornecida sob a forma de quatro provas da existência de Deus na Ética, Parte I, 
proposição 11. Demonstro, a partir dela, que Spinoza adota uma abordagem progressive, em 
que a quarta prova da existência de Deus é mais exitosa e persuasive que a terceira; esta, por sua 
vez, mais exitosa que a segunda etc. Também esmiúço, aqui, conceitos centrais do pensamento 
de Spinoza, incluindo os conceitos de razão (ratio) e poder (potesta ou potentia). Analiso, em 
seguida, a segunda premissa do argumento spinozista do monismo substantial, conforme 
estabelecido na Ética, Parte I, proposição 4, em conjunto com Ética, Parte I, proposição 5. Aceito 
e respondo a objeção atribuída a Leibniz de que uma substância p pode ter os atributos x e y e 
uma substância q pode ter os atributos y e z, e, portanto, que substâncias podem compartilhar 
alguns atributos embora permaneçam distintas. Ao longo deste estudo, minha atenção se volta 
para os procedimentos argumentativos adotados por Spinoza. Isso resulta num fechamento, 
numa leitura internalista do texto, segundo a qual Spinoza abraça efetivamente o monism 
substantial. Na conclusão deste estudo, registro a originalidade do argumento de Spinoza em 
relação às teorias da substância do século XVII. 
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Abstract: In this paper, I inspect the grounds for the mature Spinozist argument for substance 
monism. The argument is succinctly stated at Ethics Part 1, Proposition 14. The argument appeals 
to two explicit premises: (1) that there must be a substance with all attributes; (2) that substances 
cannot share their attributes. In conjunction with a third implicit premise, that a substance 
cannot not have any attribute whatsoever, Spinoza infers that there can be no more than one 
substance. I begin the inspection with the analysis of the first premise, which is provided in the 
form of the four proofs of God’s existence in Ethics Part 1, Proposition 11. While demonstrating 
how Spinoza adopts a progressive approach, where the fourth proof of God’s existence is more 
successful and persuasive than the third, which is more successful than the second, etc., I also 
unpack concepts central to Spinoza’s thinking here, including the concepts of reason (ratio) and 
power (potesta or potentia). I then analyze the second premise of the Spinozist argument for 
substance monism, as established by Ethics Part 1, Proposition 4 in conjunction with Ethics Part 
1, Proposition 5. I take up and respond to the objection attributed to Leibniz that a substance p 
can have the attributes x and y and a substance q can have the attributes y and z, and thus that 
substances can share some attributes while remaining distinct. Throughout the study, my 
attention is focused on the argumentative procedures Spinoza adopts. This yields a close, 
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internalist reading of the text where Spinoza effectively embraces substance monism. In 
conclusion to this study, I underscore to the originality of Spinoza’s argument for seventeenth 
century theories of substance. 
Keywords: Spinoza; substance monism; proofs of God’s existence; individuation. 
 
 
Part 1: Outlining the Argument for Substance Monism 
Speaking from a broad historical perspective, the kind of substance pluralism found in 
early Aristotle and among several of his Medieval descendants does not come down to Spinoza 
in great shape. It is fair to say, in fact, that Spinoza confronts a generally contested and 
fragmented terrain of philosophical debate and discussion: the notion of substance, the belief 
that a plurality of substances populates the world and this fact can meaningfully explain natural 
phenomena was challenged by the nascent demands of mechanistic thinking.1 Take but one 
canonical example. In what sense are extended substances truly substances for Descartes if 
extended substances are created continually by God? What is more, what explanatory force can 
they play as substances, if they are shorn of power or force and serve as mere placeholders for 
an intellectually perceived geometry? 2 Yet substance monism is a radical theoretical alternative 
— and Spinoza embraces the risks clear-sightedly. He is unquestionably aware of the alternatives 
to this view, and he is also aware that it would have likely had implausible-looking consequences 
 
1 As has been abundantly documented by Robert Pasnau in Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). For reactions to Descartes specifically, see more recently Tad M. Schmaltz, The Metaphysics 
of the Material World: Suàrez, Descartes, Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 
2 On this specific point, see Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992). The Cartesian theory of substance is a complex subject. One would do well to return to the central texts, 
such as Descartes Principles of Philosophy, I.51, where tensions in the bona fide substantiality of created substance are 
especially salient. There, we see Descartes carefully hedging his definition of substance as that which enjoys genuine 
independent existence by appealing to the notion of God’s “concurrence.” Descartes’ understanding of concurrence 
is indebted to Scholastic discussions (Burgersdijk makes a similar point in Institutionum, Book II, Ch. 1, §4). Created 
substances thereby remain substances, even if they are only substances in a relatively weak sense insofar as their 
subsistence requires God’s concurrence. At the heart of the Cartesian definition of substance in the Principles is the 
belief that “not depending on another being” is essential to the nature of substance. Beings qualify as substances, 
understood as capable of subsisting, if and only if they are not caused by another. But created substances causally 
depend on other created substances and on God. Descartes wants that we grant his middle-of-the-road appeal to 
concurrentism, and that we accept that even though created substances are indeed caused by another, they are not 
caused by another in such a way that the fact they are substances is called into question. Even with this restriction 
in mind, created substances can satisfy the criteria of substance Descartes gave in his Geometrical Exposition in 
response to Mersenne, namely substanding [Geometrical Exp., Def. V / AT VII 161 / CSM II 114], as created 
substance can be logically held to be a subject in which properties reside, even if its persistence or existence requires 
God’s concurrence. On the other hand, if we deny Descartes this middle-of-the-road appeal to concurrentism, and 
hold that being a substance requires absolute independence, then we are on the way to embracing Spinoza’s 
substance monism. The fact that Descartes opened the door to Spinoza was widely appreciated by Spinoza’s 
immediate successors. 
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both for leading figures in the historic, linguistic, and philosophical tradition within which 
Spinoza worked as well as for so-called common-sense. 
Several prominent interpretations are already on hand for making sense of Spinoza’s 
argument for substance monism and the arguments for the existence of God.3 Some of these 
interpretations will be called on in what follows, though I have attempted to the best of my 
ability to bracket the secondary literature and “return to the text itself” for the purposes of this 
close reading and reconstruction.  
Now, my reader may balk at the fact that I further bracket several key philosophical or 
historical issues here. For example, I will not dwell on whether the term “substance monism” is 
an appropriate term, considering the fact that “monism” implies “oneness,” or number, and 
considering Spinoza’s (wavering) depreciation of measure and number as capable of yielding a 
rational understanding of Natura naturans.4 I will not, moreover, discuss closely related and 
important issues in Spinoza’s mereology and connected issues in metaphysical priority.5 Nor will 
I be interested here in saying what I think the divine substance “really” is for Spinoza, correctly 
construed, though I will hint at least one possible answer. I am simply interested in discussing 
the elemental parts of Spinoza’s view, the inner constitution, as it were, of his deep metaphysical 
commitment to substantial oneness. 
 
3 In the English-language literature, see esp. Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s “Ontological” Argument” [1979], reprinted 
in Don Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Martin Lin, 
“Spinoza’s Arguments for the Existence of God”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:2 (2007): 269-297; and 
Mogens Lærke, “Spinoza’s Cosmological Argument in the Ethics”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 49:4 (2011): 439-
462. In the French-language literature, see esp. Alexandre Matheron, “Physique et ontologie chez Spinoza 
l’énigmatique réponse à Tschirnhaus” [1991], in Alexandre Matheron, Etudes sur Spinoza et la philosophie à l’âge classique 
(Lyon: ENS Lyon, 2011) and Jean-Luc Marion, “Spinoza ou l’unification des preuves de l’existence de Dieu”, in 
Jean-Luc Marion, Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2021). I independently reach a similar conclusion as Matheron in maintaining that Spinoza’s ontological 
proofs are progressively compelling. Matheron considers that they “gagnent en pureté intuitive” (583) and succeed 
one another “comme en une sorte de parcours initiatique,” (583) yielding a more precise ontology of power. 
4 This issue is prominently treated in Gueroult, Spinoza 1, Appendix 9 on the Letter on Infinity, 500-529. On the 
issue of the “numerical” nature of infinite, see Ramond’s nuanced discussion in Charles Ramond, Qualité et quantité, 
ch. 2. Returning to the issue of how “far-reaching Spinoza’s depreciation of number is,” (245) Lærke argues in 
Mogens Lærke “Spinoza’s Monism? What Monism”, in Spinoza on Monism, ed. Goff, that Spinoza does not, nor can 
he claim that there is “one substance,” but he does not for his part correct how “divine unity” should be understood 
for Spinoza (246). Della Rocca, in Michael Della Rocca, “The Elusiveness of the One and the Many in Spinoza: 
Substance, Attribute, and Mode”, in Spinoza in Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophy, ed. Stetter and 
Ramond, goes further still, arguing (67-71) that “divine unity” (or God’s being “one and the same”) can be 
understood as an improper and a proper designation, since, on the one hand, there are none of the same nature or 
essence as God, but on the other hand, the thinking substance and the extended substance both exist and are not 
of the same nature or essence. 
5 See Ghislain Guigon in “Spinoza on Composition and Priority”, in Spinoza on Monism, ed. Goff.  
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On occasion, I will bring Spinoza’s argument into discussion with the context of its 
elaboration. I will draw attention to how Spinoza unreservedly embraces the tradition’s view on 
substance as enjoying existence by its own right, and how Spinoza thinks the only substance in 
this sense is God, since all other substances are created by God, as noted above. Naturally other 
features of Spinoza’s substance monism also tie into contextually or historically sensitive issues. 
As noted, however, I strive to bracket these issues and focus on the text itself. 
The aims of such a study are, one might think, clarificatory. What passes in textbook 
surveys as Spinoza’s doctrine of substance monism is in fact an extremely intricate package of 
arguments and claims. Only by carefully attending to the way that Spinoza ties these together to 
form a general philosophical view do we appreciate the richness and nuance of Spinoza’s 
philosophy. What is true here, it can be said, is true of the remainder of Spinoza’s doctrine as 
well. This paper I voluntarily qualify as an exercise in philosophical analysis or dissection. 
To begin, let us grant that the master statement of substance monism in Spinoza is put 
forth at 1p14: 
 
Except God, no substance can be or be conceived. [1p14] 
 
The demonstration reads: 
Since God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which 
expresses an essence of substance can be denied (by 1d6), and he 
necessarily exists (by 1p11), if there were any substance except God, it 
would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two 
substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by 1p5) is absurd. 
And so except God, no substance can be or, consequently, be 
conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would have to be conceived 
as existing. But this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. 
Therefore, except for God no substance can be or be conceived, 
Q.E.D.” [1p14d] 
 
This demonstration calls on two propositions and one definition. One of the propositions is 
demonstrated by means of Spinoza’s ontological arguments for the existence of God [1p11], the 
other, more peculiar still, consists in the claim that no two substances can share any attribute or 
“affection” [1p5]. The definition of God states that God an absolutely infinite entity of which 
any attribute is an essential feature expressing its eternal essence [1d6]. For the purposes of 
elucidating substance monism, we must grant that Spinoza’s definition of God is relevant to 
theology properly understood, whether we doubt that such a “God” is, as Leibniz famously 
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remarked, anything more than a mere “Metaphysical something” [A VI, iii, 474f]. A more serious 
concern that I shall soon take up is whether Spinoza’s definition of God does not form a patently 
invalid premise in the proof of the existence of God. I will argue that it does not, provided it is 
construed as a real definition offering a true description of a thing. 
 Attending to 1p14, we see that the argument for substance monism is rather easy to 
reconstruct in its valid logical form, since it involves but two explicit premises and one implicit 
premise: 
 
(1) There must be some substance with infinite or all attributes. 
(2) There cannot be two substances that share some attribute in common.  
 
From these premises, put forth at 1p14, and granting the further implicit premise that there 
cannot be a substance without any attribute, Spinoza can infer the validity of substance monism: 
 
(3) There cannot be more than one substance. 
 
Let us now begin by examining (1), put forth at 1p11, according to which: 
 
God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. [1p11] 
 
Spinoza adduces three demonstrations and a further scholium to prove that God necessarily 
exists, which suggests outright the significance he attached to it. This should come as no surprise, 
for God’s necessary existence secures the bedrock of Spinoza’s philosophical system in the 
Ethics. I will begin therefore by interrogating the four proofs and inspecting their logical and 
philosophical characteristics.  
 
Part 2: Spinoza’s First Proof of God’s Existence 
Spinoza’s first proof is the most succinct: 
If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Therefore 
(by 1a7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by 1p7) is 
absurd. Therefore, God necessarily exists, Q.E.D. [1p11d1] 
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There are various ways this argument can be interpreted. On one reading, at least, it is invalid.  
Take the following line of interpretation. Spinoza understands “essence involving 
existence” and “necessary existence” as equipollent. Hence, Spinoza’s claim that it is absurd to 
assert that God does not exist, following the fact that God’s essence involves existence. What 
grounds does he give us for granting this? Spinoza’s appeal to 1p7 suggests that we must grant 
this: any substance’s essence involves existence, which in turn allegedly follows from the fact 
that, since one substance cannot be produced by another substance (1p6), a substance cannot 
be produced by anything at all (1p6c).  
Already, Spinoza’s argument is quite strained. That a substance cannot be produced by 
anything at all does not entail that it must be produced, pace Spinoza at 1p7d. For example, since 
no substance can be produced, perhaps there is no substance at all. 
Now, Spinoza’s appeal to 1d1, the definition of self-causation, in 1p7d is intended to 
motivate the claim that if substance is not produced by anything, it must be self-produced, or “it 
pertains to its essence to exist” (1p7).  
One might similarly suppose that Spinoza’s discussion involves an implicit appeal to a 
second definition, the definition of God as a “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes” 
(1d6). 
In both cases, if we construe these definitions as merely nominal, or stipulative, Spinoza’s 
reasoning is invalid. In the case of the definition of God, it is incorrect to argue that insofar as 
God is conceived as substance it follows that he is such a thing. Rather, we need the definition to 
state a fact about God: God is substance. Notably, this feature of the definition of God, it’s 
being real, not nominal, leaves open the question as to where we receive this immediate knowledge 
of God’s nature qua substance, the consequences of which (read: God’s necessary existence, its 
unicity, its simplicity, etc.) later demonstrations make explicit. 
Looking to the definition of self-causation, if we take the definition as stipulative, we will 
only have a mechanism for understanding the nature of the existence of certain entities. But 
Spinoza’s use of the definition additionally requires that the mechanism pertains to entities that 
exist. 
Moreover, even if we succeed in salvaging it from being patently invalid by insisting on 
the definition of God as real, the demonstration would still, it appears, remain question-begging. 
The argument draws on the premise that God is a substance to demonstrate that God exists. 
But the consequence is contained in the premise, because substances must exist. Thus, Spinoza 
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relies on the conclusion of his argument in the premises of his argument. Upon inspection, 
therefore, the argument appears simply to be that there is a self-causing entity which exists, and 
that this “explains” why God exists. This is question-begging. 
Spinoza has several tools at his disposal for responding to the question-begging 
objection to substance monism, as we shall see with the follow-up ontological arguments. 
A further objection to this demonstration concerns the fact that the premises involved 
in 1p11d1 apply to any substance whatsoever and not only God or the substance with infinite 
or all attributes. As we saw, the argument for 1p11d1 involves appeals to 1a7 and 1p7. The latter, 
in turn, follows from 1d1 and 1p6c. Not one of these premises is restricted in its application. On 
the contrary, they apply without restriction to any substance whatsoever. Hence, 1p11d1 would 
seem to demonstrate the necessary existence of any substance. This objection, the non-divine 
substance objection, suggests outright that 1p11d1 will not stand on its own. 
 
Part 3: Spinoza’s Second Proof of God’s Existence 
The second proof is not only more intricate and involved, but also it makes a much stronger 
case for God’s necessary existence: 
 
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for 
its nonexistence. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it 
exists; but if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it 
from existing, or which takes its existence away. 
But this reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the 
thing, or be outside it. E.g., the very nature of a square circle indicates 
the reason why it does not exist, viz. because it involves a contradiction. 
On the other hand, the reason why a substance exists also follows from 
its nature alone, because it involves existence (see 1p7). But the reason 
why a circle or triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow 
from the nature of these things, but from the order of the whole of 
corporeal Nature. For from this [order] it must follow either that the 
triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now. 
These things are evident through themselves, but from them it follows 
that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which 
prevents it from existing. Therefore, if there is no reason or cause which 
prevents God from existing, or which takes his existence away, it must 
certainly be inferred that he necessarily exists. 
But if there were such a reason, or cause, it would have to be either in 
God’s very nature or outside it, i.e., in another substance of another 
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nature. For if it were of the same nature, that very supposition would 
concede that God exists. But a substance which was of another nature 
[NS: than the divine] would have nothing in common with God (by 
1p2), and therefore could neither give him existence nor take it away. 
Since, then, there can be, outside the divine nature, no reason, or, cause 
which takes away the divine existence, the reason will necessarily have 
to be in his nature itself, if indeed he does not exist. That is, his nature 
would involve a contradiction [NS: as in our second example]. But it is 
absurd to affirm this of a being absolutely infinite and supremely 
perfect. Therefore, there is no cause, or reason, either in God or outside 
God, which takes his existence away. And therefore, God necessarily 
exists, Q.E.D. [1p11d2] 
 
As per the first sentence of the long demonstration, the key notion doing the real heavy-lifting 
for Spinoza’s argument here is the so-called Principle of Sufficient Reason, or the belief that “for 
each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its 
nonexistence [cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit]” and that 
“this reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it [hæc 
vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam].” Some remarks about the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason and its role are in order. 
 What “things” does Spinoza mean to designate when he writes (§3 of the above 
demonstration) that “these things are evident through themselves?” I believe that what Spinoza 
means to say is that the examples he adduces are evidently true through themselves, and that, in 
turn, this would tell us something about the Principle of Sufficient Reason’s scope and strength. 
Thus, it would be evident that “the very nature” of a square circle “indicates” why there are no 
square circles, because any such nature evidently “involves” [involvit] (as in “implicates” or 
“implies”) a contradiction. With his choice example, Spinoza likely means something trivial like 
the categorical statement “there are some square circles” is utter nonsense, because in proffering 
it we ascribe contradictory predicates to a subject, which only a madman could deny.  
Upon closer inspection, Spinoza seems in fact to wish that we concede a further 
suppressed premise in the second version of the ontological argument for God’s necessary 
existence: 
 
(1p11d2’s Suppressed Premise): Essences or natures themselves ground the 
intelligibility of propositions about essences or natures. 
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This is to say that Spinoza would have us grant that any essence or nature has some set of 
specifiable features that can be meaningfully picked out by propositional discourse. From this it 
follows that there cannot be any such essence or nature as “square circle,” since the essence or 
nature “square circle” grounds nothing intelligible.  
Hence, illustratively, the contradiction is said by Spinoza to be “contained” in the essence 
or nature, and, furthermore, on Spinoza’s reasoning, the container is prior to that which is 
contained in it. In other words, the self-evident examples would suggest that Spinoza sees it as 
self-evident that we should concede that essences or natures: 1. obtain; and 2. yield intelligibility.  
This would mean, however, that essences themselves are at the ground-level of Spinoza’s 
reasoning, and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is extracted, as it were, from the fact that 
there are essences, not vice versa.  
Thus, the nature of the “evidence” illustrates the following suppressed argument about 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason and is relevant to discussing God’s necessary existence:  
 
(1p11d2’s Suppressed Argument): If there are reasons, this is because there are 
essences. Essences support some explanations, but not all explanations. There are 
essences of a certain sort; hence, there are reasons of a certain sort. What there is 
determines what can be intelligible.  
 
The additional talk of causality given by the Principle of Sufficient Reason’s canonical form 
complicates this picture. Regardless, with the sub-argument in hand, Spinoza will then further 
claim that “a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which prevents it from 
existing.” This is a particularly counter-intuitive claim to make and recalls the oddity of the 
suggestion at 1p7d that for want of anything that might produce a substance, substance must 
produce itself. What about the lack of barriers to some thing’s existence suggest that some thing 
innately possesses the power to exist? Further, how is this claim in fact derivable from what has 
been seen?  
Specifically, Spinoza must mean to suggest that the claim above follows if we additionally 
grant that either the reason or cause for a thing’s existence or non-existence is “contained” in 
the nature of the thing or remains “outside” it. From this, it would purportedly follow that if 
there is no reason “outside” the thing that prevents its existence, then there must be a reason 
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inside it to prevent it, if it does not exist; hence, conversely, if it exists, that must be because 
nothing “contained” in it prevents it.  
Yet still, the reluctant reader may demur: what about the absence of an innate barrier to 
existence yields an innate reason or cause, i.e., a real power, grounded in the nature of the thing 
itself? This difficulty in the argument will only be taken up with the third proof, when Spinoza 
explicitly treats of how divine power relates to divine unity and divine existence.6  
In any case, the key take-away from the opening argument and appeal to the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason consists in the claim that to establish necessary existence we must first 
establish that which the essence or nature itself grounds, or “contains”. As we continue to follow 
Spinoza in his second ontological argument, this feature of the argument becomes even more 
salient. On the one hand, it is because a substance’s nature “contains” everything relevant to its 
existence that nothing “outside” it can act as a barrier to its existence. The argument relies on a 
simple affirmation: no two substances can interact, because no two substances have anything in 
common, since any substance is conceived through itself. Hence, “a substance which was of 
another nature […] could neither give him existence nor take it away.”  
 What of contrary reasons or causes “contained inside” the divine nature? Alas, Spinoza 
does not have much to say, besides exclaiming that “it is absurd to affirm this [read: that “his 
nature would involve a contradiction”] of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect.” 
What about being “absolutely infinite” and “supremely perfect” prohibits having a reason or 
cause that would itself prohibit existence? The term “supremely” is particularly difficult to 
grapple with, since it is not clear whether this means having all perfections or merely having only 
those perfections that can be had in some full-bodied way. Conceivably, two perfections (or, 
perhaps, realities or qualities) could be contrary, depending on what perfections one admits of 
God. Traditionally, for instance, omnipotence and divine benevolence appear at odds, whence 
the problem of divine theodicy.  
In short, Spinoza’s suggestion that it is “absurd” that a “being absolutely infinite and 
supremely perfect” could have a nature that “involves a contradiction” depends for its cogency 
on a specifically Spinozist understanding of what constitutes a perfection, and it further implies 
 
6 Spinoza’s views on “Power” (potestas) and how they differ from his views on “power” (potentia) are heavily debated 
in the French and Italian literature, but I do not intend on engaging in that exegesis here, primarily because I do not 
find the distinction to be essential for understanding Spinoza’s understanding of divine power and how divine 
power relates to divine unity and existence. For discussion, see Antonio Negri, L’anomalia selvaggia: Saggio su potere e 
Potenza in Baruch Spinoza (Milan: M.B.P, 1982). For criticism, see Charles Ramond, Le Dictionnaire Spinoza, entry 
“Pouvoir/Puissance” (Paris: Ellipses, 2007). 
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that certain features or perfections traditionally ascribed to the divine entity do not, in fact, 
pertain to it, such as benevolence, freedom of the will, etc. (The fourth and final proof will return 
to the issue of divine “perfection”.) 
 
Part 4: Spinoza’s Third Proof of God’s Existence 
The third proof inaugurates a further angle of approach to an underlying issue that remained 
unanalyzed in the second ontological argument and that will receive abundant treatment in the 
fourth and final argument. This concerns the innate and indwelling power of the divine entity to 
exist, and not merely the absence of any innate impediment to divine existence. The third 
demonstration thus reads: 
To be able not to exist is to lack power, and conversely, to be able to 
exist is to have power (as is known through itself). So, if what now 
necessarily exists are only finite beings, then finite beings are more 
powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this, as is known through 
itself, is absurd. So, either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite being 
also exists. But we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else, which 
necessarily exists (see 1a1 and 1p7). Therefore an absolutely infinite 
Being—i.e. (by 1d6), God—necessarily exists, Q.E.D. [1p11d3] 
 
Spinoza qualifies this discussion of God’s existence in the following scholium as “a posteriori” 
and judges it easier to grasp than the a priori counterpart that will receive its treatment in that 
scholium. The first element in the discussion here is the important view that “to be able not to 
exist is to lack power” and “to be able to exist is to have power”. Hence, it follows that the entity 
with necessary existence has the most power. Spinoza is clearly right to maintain that these are 
logically converse propositions, but it’s not clear why he asserts that it is “known through itself” 
that this set of converse propositions is valid. It suggests that the underlying suppressed premise 
is accepted by all, namely: 
 
(1p11d3’s Suppressed Premise): Power is a requisite of actual existence. 
 
Put thusly, the suppressed premise appears trivial. Why note that existence requires the power 
to exist, since its negation is patently self-contradictory? Stated otherwise: if something does not 
have possible existence — read: if there is no possible world in which the thing exists, and it is 
metaphysically impossible that it exists — how could it have actual existence, granted that actual 
existence is possible existence with some additional feature, or that the actual world is one possible 
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world? (Even if no other world is in fact possible, as Spinoza would argue, it does not follow 
that the actual world is not “possible” whatsoever, whatever that would mean, but rather that 
the actual world is the only possible world.)  
In papers dating from 1676 and onwards, such as in his Quod Ens perfectissimum existit, 
Leibniz draws attention this suppressed premise in the argument, and rightly so. Leibniz helps 
us to see the interest of the suppressed premise, for it tacitly further suggests that, on Spinoza’s 
accounts, we have already granted that God has possible existence, or that the divine entity is 
possible.  
Let us leave the Leibnizian point to the side, however, and further analyze the next 
element in Spinoza’s a posteriori argument. Spinoza writes that “if what now necessarily exists are 
only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being.” The 
wording is off-putting but should not trouble us too much. Spinoza did not intend to maintain 
that finite beings necessarily exist. Rather, Spinoza wants to compare the power of what can 
possibly exist and cannot not exist with the power of finite things which, actually existing, must be 
able to possibly exist, but which also possibly could not exist. Now, it would be allegedly “known 
through itself” that the latter cannot be “more powerful” than the former. Therefore, since finite 
things actually exist (such as human beings), that which is “more powerful” must also exist, 
namely God. 
 
Part 5: Spinoza’s Fourth Proof of God’s Existence 
It is in the fourth and final demonstration (a scholium, in fact) that the most original and most 
sophisticated of Spinoza’s versions of the proof of God’s existence is laid out. As with the 
previous a posteriori argument, here the discussion pivots on the Spinozist notion of power, which 
imbues it with a certain originality and force: 
In this last demonstration I wanted to show God’s existence a posteriori, 
so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily—but not 
because God’s existence does not follow a priori from the same 
foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the 
more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of 
itself, to exist. Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, or God, has, of 
himself, an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, he 
exists absolutely. 
Still, there may be many who will not easily be able to see how evident 
this demonstration is, because they have been accustomed to 
contemplate only those things that flow from external causes. And of 
these, they see that those which quickly come to be, i.e., which easily 
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exist, also easily perish. And conversely, they judge that those things to 
which they conceive more things to pertain are more difficult to do, i.e., 
that they do not exist so easily. But to free them from these prejudices, 
I have no need to show here in what manner this proposition—what 
quickly comes to be, quickly perishes—is true, nor whether or not all 
things are equally easy in respect to the whole of Nature. It is sufficient 
to note only this, that I am not here speaking of things that come to be 
from external causes, but only of substances that (by 1p6) can be 
produced by no external cause. 
 
For things that come to be from external causes—whether they consist of many 
parts or of few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external 
cause; and therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of their external 
cause, and not from their own perfection. On the other hand, whatever perfection 
substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its existence must follow from its 
nature alone; hence its existence is nothing but its essence. 
Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the 
contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away. So there is nothing of whose existence 
we can be more certain than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite, or perfect, 
being—i.e., God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute 
perfection, by that very fact it takes away every cause of doubting his existence, and gives 
the greatest certainty concerning it. I believe this will be clear even to those who are only 
moderately attentive. [1p11s] 
 
There are three key premises in this a priori argument for God’s necessary existence: 
 
(1) “[…] since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to 
the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist.” 
 
(2) “[…] things that come to be from external causes—whether they consist of many 
parts or of few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the 
external cause; and therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of their 
external cause, and not from their own perfection.” 
 
From these, Spinoza then further derives the claim that: 
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(3) “[…] Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the 
contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away.” 
 
It is due to the equivalence established in premise (2) between “perfection” and “reality” that 
Spinoza can assert that, in view of premise (1), premise (3) holds. An additional important feature 
of premise (2) concerns the clarification that if something “comes to be” from an external cause, 
it owes its “perfection” or “reality” to the “power” of the external cause; hence, its “existence” 
arises from the “perfection” of the external cause. Here, Spinoza runs together “existence”, 
“perfection”, “reality”, and “power”. 
 What then is the precise conceptual content of the notion of power brought to bear on 
Spinoza’s fourth ontological argument? It is difficult to pin down exactly without evoking several 
other equivalent (and equally elusive) terms like “perfection” or “reality” or “existence.”  
I suspect that evincing the underlying and unique causal structure of things might be, for 
Spinoza, the key motivating issue here. 
A theory of substance as causally powerful is nothing new. Created substances play key 
roles as natural agents of causation and thus as powerful entities in the world of his predecessors, 
some of whom took it as self-evident that substances must be powerful. Aquinas, for example, 
maintains without hesitation that: 
The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the 
cause of its proper accidents, whence also it is included in the definition 
of accident. Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence 
as their cause. [Sum. Theol., Ia, qu. 77, art. 6] 
 
Aquinas continues to note that “all the powers of the soul, flow from the soul, as from their 
principle” [Sum. Theol., Ia, qu. 77, art. 6, resp.]. Again, he maintains that the “emenation of a 
substance’s proper accidents [emenatio propriorum accidentium ad subjecto] does not happen by some 
transformation, but is a natural result, in the way that one thing naturally results from another, 
such as color from light” [Sum. Theol., Ia, qu. 77, art. 6, resp.].  
Looking ahead in Spinoza’s Ethics, we find that he puts the view of substance’s (causal) 
power to extensive use. For instance, according to 2p7, we find that this causal structure is one 
and the same across anything that belongs to substance, like its essential qualities, or attributes. 
This is called the ‘parallelism’ doctrine. Thus, the fact that God’s power of acting and power of 
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thinking, for example, are one and the same (2p7c), follows from the fact that there is only one 
causal structure underlying things. Moreover, Spinoza’s discussions of God’s power to exist in 
1p11s show us that Spinoza’s fully developed argument for God’s necessary existence involves 
the identification of God’s reality or perfection being unbounded with God’s power being 
unbounded.  
A second issue also bears underscoring. Spinoza’s discussions of the unique substance’s 
“power to exist” recall the view on substance espoused by Descartes in Principles of Philosophy 
I.51. For Descartes, only God is a substance in the sense put forth at Principles I.51, because 
God is the only substance that exists without the “concurrence” of another substance. Descartes 
wrote that: 
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists 
in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there 
is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other 
thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we 
perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s concurrence. 
[Principles I.51 / AT VIIIA 25 / CSM I 210] 
 
Spinoza’s view in 1p11s of God as necessary existent belongs to this tradition of discussions of 
how if we think of substance as subsisting or existing by its own power, then certainly, God is 
the only substance, since all other “substances” are causally created by God. 
To return to Spinoza’s line of argument itself, unlike in the second ontological argument 
examined above, where Spinoza contented himself with showing that no “cause or reason” can 
be “contained” within the divine nature that forbids its existence (read: the divine essence cannot 
be contradictory), here the aim is to show that some cause or reason compels divine existence 
from within and that this cause or reason pertains to the divine essence. That “cause or reason” 
is implicated in the Spinozist concept of a thing’s indwelling power as requisite for its possible 
existence. Premise (1) is particularly noteworthy in this regard, since it shows that, for Spinoza, 
a thing’s amount of power equals the thing’s amount of reality.  
This suggests an embrace of what is sometimes called the Principle of Plenitude. Broadly 
stated, the view would be that the divine nature “involves” (as in “implicates” or “implies” or 
“contains”) the most amount of reality or perfection, and therefore, that it has the greatest claim 
on existence or the greatest power to exist vis-à-vis any other contender or possible substance.7 
 
7 For discussion of the claim that reality, for Spinoza, is quantifiable, see Ramond, Qualité et quantité, esp. Ch. 1. 
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This suggests a very odd sounding view, however, as if some essences, or merely possible 
substances with fewer than infinite attributes, struggled amongst themselves to achieve existence 
and fell short of winning the right to exist.  
Leibniz’s commentary on the direct relationship between “quantity of essence” and 
“possible existence” put forth in his De Rerum Originatione Radicali [1697] underscores a similar 
problematic to the one latent in Spinoza’s discussion of God’s necessary existence: 
First, from the fact that something exists rather than nothing, we must 
acknowledge that there is a certain urge [exigentia] for existence or (so to 
speak) a straining [praetensio] towards existing in possible things or in 
possibility or essence itself. Put briefly, essence in and of itself [per se] 
strives for existence. Whence it follows in turn that all possibles 
[possibilia]  or things expressing essence or possible reality strive for 
existence with a right [jure] proportional to [their] quantity of essence or 
reality, or to the grade of perfection which they involve; for perfection 
is nothing but quantity of essence. 
Hence, as manifestly as can be, it is understood that, out of the infinite 
combinations of possibles [possibilia] and possible series, that exists 
through which the greatest quantity of essence or possibility is brought 
into existence.8 [G VIII 302-308] 
 
Though insightful by way of comparison and though useful as a heuristic tool, it is implausible 
that Spinoza would have shared Leibniz’s view and conceived of possibilia as waging a total war 
amongst themselves of winner-takes-all existence, the strongest, the one with the most amount 
of perfection or reality, being the one that prevails. (Though, to be fair, it is equally implausible 
that Leibniz genuinely believed that mere possibilia do anything at all, strictly speaking.) Yet in a 
letter sent to Johannes Hudde from Voorburg in June 1666, Spinoza does give some clue as to 
how the understanding involved in 1p11s of the strivings of hypothetical substances might be 
understood naturalistically, that is if we construe these strivings in terms of what a given nature 
“requires”: 
Since the nature of God does not consist in a definite kind of being, but 
in a being which is absolutely unlimited [indeterminatum], his nature also 
requires [exigit] everything which expresses being [esse] perfectly, since 
otherwise his nature would be limited and deficient. [Ep. 36] 
 
 
8 G. W. Leibniz, “On the Ultimate Origin of Things”, in Philosophical Essays, ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989), 150 [translation modified]. 
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We may gather that when Spinoza states that God “requires” or “demands” such-and-such 
Spinoza means that it is a law of nature that such-and-such follows from God. We also know 
that what expresses being, for Spinoza, is called an “attribute”. Hence, cashing in the metaphor 
above, we may paraphrase Spinoza as holding that it is a law of nature that the essence of a 
substance constituted by any attribute infinite in its kind is also constituted by all other attributes.  
So, it is a law of nature that the maximally real substance obtains. In other words, the Principle 
of Plenitude had been only stated figuratively and illustratively. Thus, granted that every 
substance must have an essence constituted by some attribute, the substance with the maximal 
number of attributes excludes other substances from existing, since no substances share 
attributes.  
 
Part 6: Spinoza’s No Shared Attribute Argument 
This brings us at last to return to the argument for substance monism stated at 1p14 and 
Premise (2) in the reconstructed argument for substance monism. Recall that (2) states that there 
cannot be two substances that share some attribute in common. Spinoza specifically advances 
this claim at 1p5. Its demonstration appeals to a special case of the so-called Principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles. It appears to be put forth at 1p4d as well. Some remarks about these 
very early propositions, and the great difficulties in understanding Spinoza on this crucial point, 
are in order. 
 Let us begin with a general philosophical remark and ponder briefly the plausibility of 
holding that Spinoza embraces the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. According to the 
principle, qualitative identity implies numerical identity. In conjunction with the less 
controversial Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals, or the view that numerical identity 
implies qualitative identity, it is involved in the bi-conditional principle called Leibniz’s Law, 
according to which numerical identity is co-existence with qualitative identity. The Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles suggests that no two things can have all the exact same properties and 
that two individual things cannot differ solo numero. Likewise, the Principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles suggests that qualitatively identical things cannot be individuated. This principle 
readily lends itself to believe in the purely qualitative constitution of things, a belief Robert 
Adams has baptized the belief in “primitive suchnesss,” to be contrasted with the belief in 
“primitive” and “nonqualitative” (along with, presumably, non-descriptive) “thisness” or 
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haecceitas of things.9 Following J. M. E. McTaggart, we may also refer to the same principle as the 
Dissimilarity of the Diverse, or the fact that if x and y are distinct then there is at least one 
property that x has and y does not or vice versa.10 Some, such as Michael Della Rocca, have 
maintained that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles can be understood as derivable from 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason.11 On this understanding of the roots of the former principle, 
it is because no reason or explanation can be given for the non-identity of two things which 
share all of their properties or features that the former principle holds. 
Is it plausible to suggest that Spinoza embraces such a principle, even though he does 
not state it formally? Perhaps so. If attributes or essential natures, i.e. a qualitative constitution, 
did not exhaust the individuation of substances, then there could indeed be primitive, perhaps 
conceptually inaccessible substances distinct from that substance which has all attributes. There 
is some debate now whether Spinoza extends his embrace of the Principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles across his metaphysics, particularly with regards to his strange view that the mind 
and the body are one and the same, which on its own suggests that numerically identical things 
do not need share all their properties. But this does not concern us here. Let us now turn to the 
propositions in question. According to 1p4: 
Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either 
by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in 
their affections. [1p4] 
 
The demonstration reads: 
Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by 1a1), i.e. (by 1d3 and 
1d5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their 
affections. Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through 
which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except 
substances, or [sive] what is the same (by 1d4), their attributes, and their 
affections, Q.E.D. [1p4d] 
 
Of special note is the strict identification Spinoza makes in the demonstration of “substances” 
and “their attributes.” Spinoza will draw dramatic conclusions from this premise in the following 
proposition. The vagueness of 1p4’s wording can be dissipated if we accept that by “distinct 
things” Spinoza means to refer to substances themselves.  
 
9 Robert Merrihew Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy 76:1 (1979): 5-26. 
10 J. M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, ed. C. D. Broad, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1927),101. 
11 Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza. London: Routledge, 2008. 
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The claim here, then, is that two substances can only be distinguished from one another 
by virtue of some qualitative difference, or difference in properties — a difference in the 
substances’ attributes, and therefore a difference in the very essence or nature of the substances, 
or a difference in the substances’ affections. 
The demonstration is also interesting in that here we find that Spinoza sees as equivalent 
the metaphysical view that everything that is must be in itself or in another, and the entities 
expounded in his ontology, namely substance and mode. Attribute is superfluous in this regard, 
since it is only that which the intellect picks out as the nature of substance. Likewise, because 
conception and existence are equipollent in the realm of Spinoza’s ground-level ontology (a 
substance is “in itself” and “conceived through itself,” whereas a mode is “in another” and 
“conceive through another”), one can see 1p4d as licensing the view that Spinoza’s embrace of 
the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is in some respect motivated by his commitment to 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  
 1p5 itself is intriguing, but difficult to set straight. 1p5 is the first proposition of the Ethics 
that a genuine Cartesian (or Aristotelian, for that matter) would refuse to countenance. 
According to 1p5: 
 
In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature 
or [sive] attribute. [1p5] 
 
The demonstration reads: 
If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be 
distinguished from one another either by a difference in their attributes, 
or by a difference in their affections (by 1p4). If only by a difference in 
their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the 
same attribute. But if by a difference in their affections, then since a 
substance is prior in nature to its affections (by 1p1), if the affections 
are put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by 1d3 
and 1a6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished 
from another, i.e. (by 1p4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the 
same nature or attribute], Q.E.D. [1p5d] 
 
The most persistent issue in the literature about the demonstration is understanding why Spinoza 
thinks he is entitled to take the affections of substance and “put them to one side” in his 
discussion of what allows for distinct substances to obtain. The feeling is, of course, that Spinoza 
has merely “put to one side” the very question that needed answering. For if there were two 
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substances that shared some attribute, but had different affections conceived under that 
attribute, should we not say these were distinct substances? Let us call this the affections 
objection.  
Another persistent issue in the literature concerns the objection, originally made by 
Leibniz, that even we concede that a substance cannot share all of its attributes with another 
substance, perhaps two substances can share some attributes in common, but have others they 
do not share, through which they are distinguished. Read: substance a might have attributes x 
and y and substance b might have attributes y and z. Hence, there would be in nature two 
substances of the same attribute (y), though the two substances would also each hold a second 
attribute not in common (a has x and b has z), thus remaining distinct. Let us call this the second 
attribute objection. 
 Let us address these two objections in turn. In fact, resolving the one will immediately 
allow us to resolve the other, since both objections can be resolved if we understand that, for 
Spinoza, attribute exhaustively constitutes the nature of substance. 
Take the affections objection. The reason Spinoza feels entitled to put the affections “to 
one side” is that, as he writes, substance is prior in nature to its affections, and whereas the latter 
are conceived through it, the former is always conceived through itself. Now, the affections 
themselves are merely expressions of the attributes. This is to say that a distribution of 
differences in the affections of attributes is reducible to a distribution of differences in the 
natures of attributes. Implicitly, Spinoza reasons that only distributions of differences among the 
natures of attributes are meaningful for understanding differences in the natures of substance. 
The differences in the affections of attributes only cut so deep, and thus, Spinoza can set them 
to the side without begging the question. Is Spinoza thereby forced to concede that affections 
are mere accidents, as in they are inessential to understanding the natures of substances? Not 
necessarily. The affections are not inessential expressions, or accidental, but they are still 
expressions, and thus we would do well, argues Spinoza, to see of what natures they are 
expressions.  
Turning to the second attribute objection, again Spinoza’s argument draws its force from 
the claim that whether a substance has a myriad of attributes (and an infinite substance will have 
infinite attributes, claims Spinoza), each of those attributes still exhausts the constitution of its 
nature. Hence, it is enough for substances to share any attribute for them to share natures. But 
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this contradicts the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles as set forth in 1p4. Thus, there cannot 
be substances which share some attribute in common. 
We are therefore left with the necessary premise (2) for the reconstruction of the 
Spinozistic argument for substance monism. Some substance has infinite or all attributes. No 
substances can share attributes. There is only one substance. 
Granted, this only begs a further question. How can some substance (read: God), with 
an infinity of attributes, still have one and the same essence or nature, such that any one of those 
attributes is an adequate expression of God’s essence or nature, and such that we cannot 
conceive of another substance that shares any of the same attributes without thereby 
contradicting the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles?  
Once more, the answer might be at hand in Spinoza’s conception of power. On 
Spinoza’s account, substance is power, or God’s essence is his power (1p34). It is because of the 
strict identification of power and essence that the number of attributes which constitute the 
totality of attributes belonging to substance is irrelevant. The lawlike unfolding of substance, its 
innate power, also called “the order and connection of causes” (2p7) remains identical across 
attributes. Thus, the fact that attribute “constitutes” [constituit] the essence of substance (1d4) 
should be seen as a technical term, as meaning both “gives content to” and “adequately 
explains”. Substance’s power, as cause of itself, to unfold this essence that receives content 
expression via its attributes remains without impingement. 
To briefly conclude, I will underscore two broad points that have emerged on my reading 
of the text. First, it is debatable whether Spinoza’s definition of substance is original.12 It seems 
not. What is more certain however is that Spinoza puts his understanding of substance to use in 
a novel fashion. I have attended to Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, rather than his 
 
12 Wolfson, for one, does not think that it is. He takes this up in his discussion of the theory of mode, however. 
Spinoza’s understanding of mode “strikes out a new line” vis-à-vis Aristotelian accident, “Spinoza’s definition of 
substance contains nothing new”; rather, “he only restricts its application by firmly insisting upon its rigid logical 
meaning” (Philosophy of Spinoza, 66). Note that, for Wolfson, when the Aristotelians say that “a concrete object exists 
in something else,” this may mean either that a body exists in a place or a part exists in a whole (69). For Spinoza, 
on the other hand, that there is no such thing as a finite substance means that “everything that is in something else 
in any sense or manner” cannot be a substance (71). Thus, it is merely a rigid application of substance, as being, on 
Wolfson’s view of Spinoza, “only that which is really and absolutely in itself” or “God” (71). Wolfson understands 
the replacement of “accident” by “mode” to mean something more meaningful, which is that accidents require 
subjects, but substance is no subject (72); it is a summum genus; it is inconceivable and unknowable; it is conceived 
through itself, which means it is not conceived (76). For a rebuttal of Wolfson’s view on substance as summum genus, 
see Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, Ch. 1. Although I agree with Curley’s interpretation of this as unacceptable, largely 
because it turns substance into a universal, contra Spinoza, nonetheless, I find congenial Wolfson’s view that 
Spinoza’s originality consists in his rigid application of the notion of substance, and not in forging a new concept of substance. 
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definition of substance. It is in Spinoza’s argument for there being one substance that his 
originality is salient; and it is in the fact that he takes this argument as essential for his broader 
moral and political philosophy wherein largely lies the scandal according to his immediate 
posterity. Admittedly, I do not profess to know how we may accurately characterize this one-of-
a-kind divine substance for Spinoza. Certainly, a key element in that characterization, as witness 
in the demonstration, is power. Somewhere down the line, it seems that Spinoza thinks of the one 
divine substance as one divine power. Divine substance would thus be that one power that 
produces everything handed over to the senses or the mind. But this only invites further 
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